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Dodd-Frank’s Extension of 
Criminal Corporate Liability 
through the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: Enabling 
Whistleblowers and Monitoring 
Conflict Minerals 
 
Tim Bakken 
 
I.    Introduction: New Crimes and Proving Old Crimes 
 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”)1 has been characterized as 
the most significant financial reform legislation since the Great 
Depression,2 when the nation adopted the Securities Act of 
19333 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.4  The Dodd-
 
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect 
the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department 
of Defense, or the U.S. government. 
1. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-
Frank Act]. 
2. As one commentator has suggested: 
 
Dodd-Frank represents the most sweeping changes to the 
financial regulatory environment in the United States since 
the Great Depression.  While its enactment was important, 
it is seriously flawed.  It does not deal with regulatory 
fragmentation, sidesteps international coordination, and is 
overly optimistic in dealing with too-big-to-fail. Going first 
doesn’t mean you get it right. 
 
Edward F. Greene, Dodd-Frank and the Future of Financial Regulation, 2 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 79, 79 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/HBLR-Greene_Symposium1.pdf. 
3. See generally Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2012)). 
4. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012)). 
1
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Frank Act makes so many changes and leaves so much rule-
making to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
that a generation will probably pass before its implications are 
understood.  In the criminal area, the Dodd-Frank Act creates 
new crimes5 – twenty-two by one estimate6 – and also makes 
recklessness the mens rea for several crimes,7 creating greater 
liability for lesser culpability when compared to crimes whose 
mens rea element is intent or willfulness. 
Specifically, the Dodd-Frank Act provides lucrative 
financial incentives for corporate agents who reveal 
 
5. See e.g., Dodd-Frank Act §§ 723, 124 Stat. at 1675 (to be codified at 7 
U.S.C. § 2) (clearing), 724, 124 Stat. at 1682, 1684 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 6s, 6d) (swaps, segregation, and bankruptcy treatment), 725, 124 Stat. at 
1685 (repealed 2015) (derivatives clearing), 728, 124 Stat. at 1697 (to be 
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 24a) (swap data repositories), 730, 124 Stat. at 1702 (to 
be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6t) (large swap trader reporting), 731, 124 Stat. at 
1703 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s) (registration and regulation of swap 
dealers, and major swap participants), 741, 124 Stat. at 1730-31 (to be 
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6b-1) (enforcement), 745, 124 Stat. at 1735 (repealed 
2015) (enhanced compliance by registered entities), 746, 124 Stat. at 1738 (to 
be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c) (insider trading), 747, 124 Stat. at 1739 (to be 
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c) (antidisruptive practices authority), 749 (to be 
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6d) (conforming amendments), 753, 124 Stat. at 1750 (to 
be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 9) (anti-manipulation authority), 763, 124 Stat. at 
1762, 1768-69, 1774, 1777-79, 1781 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c-3, 78c-
4, 78c-5, 78f, 78i, 78j-2, 78m) (amendments to the Securities Exchange Act), 
764, 124 Stat. at 1785 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10) (registration and 
regulation of security-based swap dealers and major security-based swap 
participants), 768, 124 Stat. at 1800-01 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b) 
(amendments to the Securities Act and treatment of security-based swaps), 
929, 124 Stat. at 1852 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78g) (unlawful margin 
lending), 929l, 124 Stat. at 1861 (to be codified 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j, 78o) 
(enhanced applications of antifraud provisions), 929x, 124 Stat. at 1870 (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78) (short sale reforms), 975, 124 Stat. at 1916 (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4) (regulations of municipal securities and changes 
to the board of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board), 1031, 124 Stat. 
at 2005 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531) (prohibiting unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive acts or practices), 1036, 124 Stat. at 2010 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5536) (prohibited acts), 1472, 124 Stat. at 2187, 2190 (to be codified at §§ 
1604, 1639e) (appraisal independence requirements). 
6. See generally Tiffany M. Joslyn, Criminal Provisions in the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, FEDERALIST SOC’Y, 
(Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/criminal-
provisions-in-the-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-consumer-protection-act. 
7. See Dodd-Frank Act § 745, 124 Stat. at 1735 (repealed 2015); see also 
id. §§ 746, 753, 124 Stat. at 1738, 1750 (to be at codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6c(a), 
9). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/1
 2015 DODD-FRANK’S EXTENSION 3 
wrongdoing within corporations.8  Also, the Act’s conflict 
minerals provision requires companies to issue reports that 
describe their production of valuable minerals in several 
African nations, where the rule of law is often not observed.9  
The new provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act provide the 
government with new methods of monitoring corporations and 
finding what might be the vastly understated and largely 
concealed practice of corporations rewarding foreign officials 
for access to markets in foreign nations.10 
The Dodd-Frank Act creates and criminalizes a new kind 
of insider trading, in which federal employees are prohibited 
from releasing government information,11 an intangible kind of 
interest similar to the property interest in some insider trading 
cases.12  This provision may raise significant questions, even 
First Amendment constitutional questions, in that it 
criminalizes the release and/or use of government information, 
always a suspect proposition in a democracy.13 This newly 
protected government information elevates, in essence, not only 
government documents but also discussions undertaken by 
government employees about public companies and other 
business entities to the level of classified information, which is 
also criminalized.14  Moreover, unlike insider trading involving 
corporate information, where generally only the fiduciary and 
his tippee are liable,15 anyone who trades on government 
information, regardless of how far removed from the tipper, is 
liable.16 
The extraterritorial provisions17 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
appear to expand jurisdiction over foreign corporations and 
 
8. See id. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)). 
9. See id. §§ 1502(p), 1504(p), 124 Stat. at 2213, 2220, invalidated by 
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
10. See generally Mike Koelher, Archive for the ‘Dodd-Frank’ Category, 
FCPA Professor (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/category/dodd-
frank. 
11. Dodd-Frank Act § 746, 124 Stat. at 1738. 
12. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
13. Dodd-Frank Act § 746, 124 Stat. at 1738. 
14. Id. 
15. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
16. See Dodd-Frank Act § 746, 124 Stat. at 1738. 
17. See id. § 746, 124 Stat. at 1738.; see also id. § 929P(b), 124 Stat. at 
1864-65 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa, 80b-14). 
3
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thus negate Morrison v. National Australia Bank, in which the 
United States Supreme Court held that securities must be 
listed in the United States or the activities at issue in the case 
must have occurred in the United States before a federal court 
may assert jurisdiction.18  Despite its focus on new and old 
crimes, the Dodd-Frank Act pays little attention to the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”),19 the epitome of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, which remains intact.  As will be 
discussed below, however, the effect of the Dodd-Frank Act is to 
expand the reach of the FCPA, not through new statutes or 
rules directly focused on the FCPA, but rather through new 
provisions that indirectly enhance the ability of the Justice 
Department to prosecute bribery and the SEC to enforce the 
accounting, books, and records requirements of the FCPA. 
One key, compelling component that produces a more 
potent FCPA is the Dodd-Frank Act’s creation of rewards for 
whistleblowers,20 who are usually insiders and who possess the 
requisite information about illegal corporate activity to make 
prosecutions of the FCPA possible.  A second key component in 
the Dodd-Frank Act is its requirement that firms make specific 
disclosures about their payments to governments in regard to 
“conflict minerals”21 in Africa, the trade of which has fostered 
regional warfare for decades.  The additional information 
obtained from such disclosures will support bribery 
prosecutions.  Where Dodd-Frank Act disclosures are not made, 
lied about, or covered up, the government will be in a better 
position to enter into cooperation agreements with witnesses 
and investigate bribery in an alternative way. 
In a sense, through its whistleblower provision, the Dodd-
Frank Act has enabled the government to use corporate 
employee whistleblowers to support criminal prosecutions.  
That position finds agreement in this article, but the conclusion 
reached is that the results to be obtained from the 
 
18. 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
19. See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
213, 91 Stat. 1494 [hereinafter FCPA] (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78dd-1-78dd-3 (2012)). 
20. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841 (noting that the 
whistleblowing provision permits a recovery of 10-30% for the whistleblower). 
21. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2215-17, invalidated by 
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/1
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whistleblower provision will be positive.  Through an analysis 
of the Dodd-Frank Act, this article discusses further the new 
reach of the FCPA, particularly in light of the whistleblower 
and conflict-minerals provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act.  
Finally, this article concludes that although the new provisions 
can be costly, the provisions are beneficial.  The traditional 
corporate model is now more open, as firms and individuals are 
required to act with greater care and, in effect, the FCPA has 
greater vitality. 
 
II. Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower and the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 
 
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act22 is titled 
“Whistleblower Protection” and defines a whistleblower as “any 
individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation 
of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner 
established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”23  The 
provision provides a compelling incentive to individuals to 
report securities violations because it offers a reward of 10-30% 
“of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related 
actions.”24  On May 25, 2011, the SEC issued final rules to 
implement the whistleblower statute.25  Under the rules, “[t]o 
be considered for an award, the SEC’s rules require that a 
whistleblower must voluntarily provide the SEC with original 
information that leads to the successful enforcement by the 
SEC or a federal court or administrative action in which the 
SEC obtains monetary sanctions totaling more than $1 
million.”26  In explaining the rationale for the whistleblower 
statute and rules, former SEC Chairman Mary L. Shapiro 
 
22. Id. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841. 
23. Id. § 922(a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1841. 
24. Id. § 922(b)(1)(A)-(B), 124 Stat. at 1841. 
25. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Establish 
Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011) (on file with author), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-116.htm (“The new SEC 
whistleblower program, implemented under Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, is primarily intended to reward individuals who act early to expose 
violations and who provide significant evidence that helps the SEC bring 
successful cases.”). 
26. Id. 
5
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suggested that “[f]or an agency with limited resources like the 
SEC, it is critical to be able to leverage the resources of people 
who may have first-hand information about violations of the 
securities laws.”27  The government concedes that it does not 
have the resources to regulate securities markets and will rely 
on whistleblowers, who in the main will be the employees of 
corporations who possess the first-hand information that will 
lead to rewards. 
 
A.  Dodd-Frank and Corporate Culture 
 
The new whistleblower statute could change workplace 
dynamics.  If firms are concerned during the hiring process 
about which employee might become a whistleblower, they may 
investigate job candidates’ prior activities more thoroughly and 
differently.  Trust inside companies could be diminished if 
fellow employees of a potential whistleblower fear their 
innocent activities will be misconstrued and reported to 
government regulators.  Especially regarding the FCPA, 
companies’ pursuit of promising leads in developing markets 
overseas may be restrained if the companies believe their 
activities could be misconstrued.  It is the unleashing of private 
agents to do government work for a reward that concerns the 
business community, corporate compliance officers, and white-
collar criminal lawyers. 
In perhaps grudging acknowledgement of the reach of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, one prominent law firm, Fried Frank, 
pronounced the whistleblower statute a “sleeper bounty 
provision” and predicted “that this new whistleblower program 
may end up playing a key role in identifying and prosecuting 
violations of the FCPA.”28  From a criminal defense perspective, 
the whistleblower statute and rules will give additional force to 
the FCPA, which even today is murky for lack of judicial 
interpretation.  Indeed, the two essential parts of the FCPA, 
 
27. Id. 
28. Memorandum from Fried Frank to the Friends and Clients of Fried 
Frank (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter Fried Frank] (on file with author), 
http://friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/A97331BB3E441A079E01314A96
8EECD7.pdf. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/1
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requiring certain books and records to be maintained29 and 
prohibiting bribery of foreign officials,30 have led to significant 
judicial construction.  Most relevant to this article is the 
bribery provision, which states: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any issuer . . . or for any 
officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer 
or any stockholder . . . to make use of the mails 
or any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, 
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the 
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to 
give, or authorization of the giving of anything of 
value to . . . any foreign official for purposes of . . 
. influencing any act or decision of such foreign 
official in his official capacity.31 
 
Agreeing with the defense bar, one commentator finds the 
elements of the FCPA lacking in specificity32 and recommends 
that the SEC or the Department of Justice define more 
precisely the meaning of “foreign official;” what constitutes an 
“agency or instrumentality of a foreign government;” whether 
“anything of value” includes charitable contributions or 
payments made to people other than the foreign official; and “to 
what extent . . . securing an overall business advantage 
constitute[s] ‘obtaining or retaining business’ for purposes of 
the Act.”33  
 Especially with whistleblower incentives so high,34 most 
seem to believe that prosecutions under the FCPA and other 
 
29. See FCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102(b), 91 Stat. at 1494, invalidated 
by Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
30. See id. § 103(a), 91 Stat. at 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
78dd-1(a) (2012)). 
31. Id. § 103(a)(1)(A)(i), 91 Stat. at 1494. 
32. See generally Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, 
Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489 (2011). 
33. Id. at 576. 
34. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(b)(1)(A)-(B), 124 Stat. 
1376, 1841 (2010) (permitting a 10-30% of recovery for whistleblowers). 
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statutes will increase.35  “One anticipated result of the new 
whistleblower program may be an increase in the number of 
investigations and prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act . . . which at the same time raises concerns that 
corporate employees may be tempted to forego their own 
internal compliance programs.”36  In fact, the Dodd-Frank Act 
does not require whistleblowers to climb any ladder, go up any 
chain of command, or report to any supervisor.  They may go 
directly to the SEC.37  Under the Dodd-Frank Act: 
 
In any covered judicial or administrative action   
. . . the Commission . . . shall pay an award or 
awards to 1 or more whistleblowers who 
voluntarily provided original information to the 
Commission that led to the successful 
enforcement of the covered judicial or 
administrative action, or related action, in an 
aggregate amount equal to . . . not less than 10 
percent, in total, of what has been collected of the 
monetary sanctions imposed in the action or 
related actions; and . . . not more than 30 
percent, in total.38 
 
In response, corporate and defense attorneys argue that the 
Dodd-Frank Act should have required employees to report their 
perceived violation to corporate compliance officers before they 
could report to the SEC and recover a reward, which would 
permit corporations to make corrections at a low cost. 
This view is slightly optimistic, even whimsical, in that 
prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, there were virtually no 
whistleblower reports whatsoever.  “Since its inception in 1989, 
the SEC’s existing whistleblower program has paid out less 
 
35. See generally Henry Klehm III et al., Securities Enforcement Has 
Crossed the Border: Regulatory Authorities Respond to the Financial Crisis 
with a Call for Greater International Cooperation, But Where Will That 
Lead?, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 927 (2011). 
36. Id. at 936. 
37. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841. 
38. Id. § 922 (b)(1)(A)-(B), 124 Stat. at 1841. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/1
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than $160,000 to just five whistleblowers.”39  From this 
minimal whistleblower activity, one could conclude that 
corporate compliance programs were effective, in that 
whistleblowers had little about which to complain.  Further, 
from the firms’ perspectives, if potential whistleblower 
employees did have a complaint, compliance officers could 
address it and, if needed, find a remedy inside the firm.  
However, argued differently, the corporate compliance 
programs deterred whistleblowers through assimilation, 
conformity, and fear.  No employee will step forward without 
significant protection or incentives.  Without a Dodd-Frank 
Act-type whistleblower law and little prospect of compensation 
for reporting even verified securities law violations, 
whistleblower employees had no incentive to report violations.  
And they did not, except for only five over twenty years.40 
 
B. Cooperating Witnesses and Whistleblowers 
 
The government at all levels has long used cooperating 
witnesses to initiate and support criminal prosecutions, 
providing to the cooperator leniency in charging and 
sentencing.41  Almost always less reliable, at least on the 
surface, and far more culpable than whistleblowers,42 
 
39. Fried Frank, supra note 28 (citing S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111 (2010) 
(Conf. Rep.)). Continuing: 
 
In response to those statistics — which may have resulted 
from would-be whistleblowers weighing harsh reprisals 
against the prospect of low rewards for raising concerns 
about wrongdoing in a corporation — Congress included in 
the Dodd-Frank Act a minimum cash reward of 10% of any 
monetary sanctions recovered by the government to 
encourage individuals “to take the enormous risk of blowing 
the whistle in calling attention to fraud.” The government’s 
failure to detect Bernie Madoff’s fraud also spurred the SEC 
to endorse a more expansive whistleblower program. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
40. See id. 
41. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2011). 
42. Whistleblowers may have no culpability.  They cannot receive a 
financial award for a criminal conviction related to their whistleblowing. See 
9
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cooperators are pervasive in the criminal justice system.  The 
government formally recognizes and rewards their 
participation in ways far more important than the receipt of 
money.  Cooperation usually results in significantly less time in 
prison.  Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
 
Upon motion of the government stating that the 
defendant has provided substantial assistance in 
the investigation or prosecution of another 
person who has committed an offense, the court 
may depart from the guidelines. . . .  The 
appropriate reduction shall be determined by the 
court for reasons stated that may include . . . the 
significance and usefulness of the defendant’s 
assistance . . . the truthfulness, completeness, 
and reliability of any information or testimony 
provided by the defendant . . . the nature and 
extent of the defendant’s assistance . . . any 
injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to 
the defendant or his family resulting from his 
assistance . . . the timeliness of the defendant’s 
assistance.43 
 
A whistleblower normally should be met with far less alarm 
than a cooperator.  The cooperator is by nature a criminal.  If 
not, there would be no need for a cooperation agreement in 
which the cooperator agrees to testify for a benefit.  For all 
other persons, the government can simply subpoena them to 
testify, assuming they do not have a Fifth Amendment or 
common law privilege not to testify. 
It is far more difficult for a whistleblower to obtain a 
financial reward than for a cooperating criminal to obtain 
leniency.  There is no statutory limit on the cooperators that 
the government may use, nor the leniency they may receive.44  
Sammy “the Bull” Gravano received immunity from 
prosecution for nineteen murders and five years’ imprisonment 
 
Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841. 
43. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2011). 
44. See id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/1
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in satisfaction of all his crimes in return for his testimony 
against John Gotti and other members of organized crime.45  In 
contrast, the Dodd-Frank Act denies an award to: 
 
[A]ny whistleblower who is convicted of a 
criminal violation related to the judicial or 
administrative action for which the 
whistleblower otherwise could receive an award 
under this section . . . [and] to any whistleblower 
who fails to submit information to the 
Commission in such form as the Commission 
may, by rule, require.46 
 
The SEC goes even further.  In its rule47 implementing the 
whistleblower provision of the Dodd-Frank Act,48 the SEC 
prevents whistleblowers from recovery “if he or she obtained 
the information by a means or in a manner that is determined 
by a United States court to violate applicable Federal or state 
criminal law.”49  This rule will doubtlessly eliminate some 
whistleblowers, but it requires that the whistleblowers who do 
survive the rule to have relatively clean hands, unlike those of 
cooperators. 
It is likely that a cooperator will have, at some point, 
withheld information from the government, but he may, 
nonetheless, enter into a cooperation agreement.  In contrast, 
under the Dodd-Frank Act, a whistleblower “who fails to 
submit information to the Commission” will not receive an 
award.50  By nature, a whistleblower is more reliable than a 
cooperator and is unlikely to have any criminal convictions.  He 
is not blowing the whistle to avoid imprisonment on a current 
criminal case where, because of the travails of imprisonment, 
 
45. See James Ridgway de Szigethy, J. R.’s Mafia Year in Review – 2000, 
AM. MAFIA (Jan. 2001), http://americanmafia.com/feature_articles_111.html. 
46. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(c)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1841. 
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(1)(iv) (2015). 
48. Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841. 
49. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 34-64545, 
at 79-80 (May 25, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545.pdf. 
50. Id. at 133 n.293. 
11
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the cooperator has more incentive to fabricate and lie than 
probably any person in society. 
Unlike the cooperator, who executes a binding contract 
with the prosecution detailing the terms of the cooperation and 
benefits, the whistleblower has no assurance that the SEC will 
pursue his leads or charges or award him any financial benefit 
for providing “information relating to a ‘material’ violation of 
the securities laws.”51  Cooperators pervade the criminal justice 
system.  Under the Dodd-Frank Act, they may not recover if 
they are convicted of a crime related to their whistleblowing.52  
Under SEC rules, they may not recover if they obtained their 
information through criminal means.53  So long as there are 
reasons for the government to use cooperators, there will be a 
greater rationale to use whistleblowers. 
 
C. A Place for Whistleblowers 
 
Recent history and cases support the view that 
whistleblowers are needed if the government is to effectively 
enforce the FCPA.  The Department of Justice enforces the 
bribery component of the FCPA, and the SEC enforces the 
accounting and records component: 
 
The accounting and record-keeping provisions of 
the FCPA are essentially a re-enactment of 
established accounting procedures for publicly 
traded companies. As such the accounting and 
record-keeping provisions of the FCPA are 
enforced by the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC). Penalties for violating the accounting and 
record-keeping provisions of the FCPA are the 
same penalties that apply to most other 
violations of the securities laws. These penalties 
include monetary fines but no criminal 
penalties.54 
 
51. Id. at 9 (citations omitted). 
52. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(c)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1841. 
53. Id. § 922(c)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1841. 
54. Margaret Gatti et al., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Mar. 26, 2008), 
available at http://library.findlaw.com/1997/Jan/1/126234.html. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/1
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As things stand now, the government, either the Department of 
Justice or the SEC, may be plucking only a few prominent 
cases at the top point of a pyramid that has a huge base.  In 
2009, the SEC created a unit devoted to enforcement of the 
FCPA,55 and in 2011 the SEC for the first time indicated the 
number of FCPA enforcement actions that the agency brought, 
which had been previously subsumed within another 
category.56  The number was fifteen.57  The number of 
enforcement actions in 2012, 2013, and 2014 were ten, eight, 
and eight, respectively.58 
These seem like relatively few enforcement actions in light 
of the significant FCPA cases that have been brought by the 
Justice Department or SEC in just one year, for example: 
 
In 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice . . . and 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission . . 
. agreed to settle charges against: (1) the Dutch 
construction company Snamprogetti Netherlands 
B.V. for $ 365 million; (2) the French 
construction and engineering firm Technip SA 
for $ 338 million; (3) U.K. defense contractor 
BAE Systems PLC for $ 400 million; (4) German 
automaker Daimler AG for $ 185 million; and the 
global freight forwarding company Panalpina 
World Transport (Holding) Ltd., along with six 
other companies in the oil services industry, for a 
total of $ 236.5 million.59 
 
Also in 2010, Citigroup and Blackstone were among the ten 
firms that the SEC was reportedly investigating in connection 
 
55. Robert Khuzami, Director, Div. of Enf’t, SEC, Remarks Before the 
New York City Bar: My First 100 Days as Director of Enforcement (Aug. 5, 
2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch080509rk.htm. 
56. See SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited July 28, 2015) 
[hereinafter SEC Enforcement Actions]. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Westbrook, supra note 32, at 492-94. 
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with a FCPA bribery inquiry concerning officials and sovereign 
wealth funds.60  Unless human nature has improved suddenly 
and bribery has been cut in half, the declining numbers of 
enforcement actions – just eight in 2014 – may indicate that 
the SEC has been overwhelmed by the Dodd-Frank Act.61 
Just previous to 2010, in 2008 and 2009 FCPA cases, 
Seimens AG agreed to pay the government a fine of over $800 
million and Halliburton settled with the government for $579 
million.62  From 2008 to 2010, at least forty-one persons were 
arrested, indicted, or convicted of violating the FCPA.63  One 
was sentenced to eighty-seven months, “the longest prison term 
ever imposed for an FCPA violation.”64  Companies and 
individuals endure significant costs in violating the FCPA.  
But, if the costs are high, this leads to the question of why the 
violations occur in the first place.  Indeed, the corporate 
violations occurred within established business structures and 
were pervasive.65  The most plausible reason that firms take 
great risks in violating the FCPA is that the risk of getting 
caught is low. 
The concerns that the Dodd-Frank Act will adversely affect 
corporate compliance programs, if true, seem less relevant and 
slightly misplaced in light of the large recoveries obtained 
recently from very large, established firms.66  Perhaps the 
compliance programs should be affected.  Compliance programs 
are not preventing significant violations of the FCPA and 
extensive liability for the firms that the programs are designed 
to protect.  Moreover, the SEC is not bringing a large number 
of cases under the FCPA, with only twenty brought in 2010.67  
It is fair to ask whether many corporations do not have 
effective compliance programs or whether their programs exist 
 
60. Dionne Searcey & Randall Smith, SEC Probes Banks, Buyout Shops 
Over Dealings With Sovereign Funds, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2011, 12:01 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704307404576080403625366
100.html. 
61. See SEC Enforcement Actions, supra note 56. 
62. See Westbrook, supra note 32, at 556. 
63. See id. at 526-29. 
64. Id. at 527 
       65.  See generally id. 
 
66. See generally Fried Frank, supra note 28. 
67. See SEC Enforcement Actions, supra note 56. 
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as a means to shield them from liability by permitting them to 
disclaim the mens rea of intent, knowledge, and/or willfulness 
if the government brings prosecutions or enforcement actions 
against them.  “The FCPA prohibits not only direct payments 
to foreign officials, but also payments to third parties if they 
are made ‘while knowing’ that some or all of the payment will 
be used for bribery in contravention of the FCPA.”68  
Compliance programs may relieve firms from having 
knowledge imputed to them in FCPA cases, even though the 
corporate culture may not deter violations of the FCPA. 
There is some evidence that corporations attempt to shield 
themselves from FCPA liability by working through 
intermediaries.  Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, “[l]iability for the 
acts of intermediaries [was] at an all-time high in terms of 
importance: all eleven enforcement actions against companies 
in 2009 involved some type of foreign-agent conduct.”69  If 
operating in bad faith, corporations could try to avoid liability 
by claiming they could not anticipate that rouge employees who 
received FCPA compliance training would engage in bribery.  
However, the Dodd-Franks Act’s explicit recognition of 
recklessness as a basis for criminal liability may force 
compliance programs to foster a corporate culture of greater 
oversight.70 
The concern that the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower 
provision will lead employees to complain amok seems 
overstated.  Regardless of legal protection for whistleblowers, 
for personal and professional reasons, almost no employee 
wants to be a whistleblower.  Being a whistleblower is 
emotionally taxing and can be financially harmful.  Even if a 
firm cannot terminate a whistleblower, the firm’s other 
employees will understand from management’s subtle, un-
provable signals that their association with the employee-
whistleblower will be costly.  The whistleblower will work in 
silence.  The whistleblower’s opportunities within the firm, as 
well as firms in the same industry, not to mention elsewhere, 
will likely be non-existent.  Without a reward for 
 
68. Westbrook, supra note 32, at 544. 
69. Id. at 545. 
70. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 745, 124 Stat. 1376, 1735 
(2010) (repealed 2015); see also id. §§ 746, 753, 124 Stat. at 1738, 1750. 
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whistleblowers like that in the Dodd-Frank Act, few employees 
would come forward to complain. 
To corporations, general counsel, and outside defense 
attorneys, the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provision71 may 
seem potent now only because there is virtually no enforcement 
stemming from whistleblowers in the past against which to 
compare.  The SEC called fiscal year 2014 “historic” because it 
made awards to nine whistleblowers, the highest of which was 
$30 million, compared to only five previous such awards.72  The 
SEC also reported that the number of tips it received from 2011 
through 2014 increased from 334 to 3,620.73  This is a 
significant increase in reporting, but still the number of 
whistleblower awards is very low given the number of reports.  
The influence of the Dodd-Frank Act remains to be seen 
because the SEC might have too few resources to properly 
enforce the statute’s provisions. 
Thus, given the scarcity of complaints, at least until the 
Dodd-Frank Act, and the relatively few enforcement actions 
and recoveries, a fear of false whistleblower complaints would 
seem overstated.  Moreover, a corporation and its employees 
should have no internal conflict among employees if the 
whistleblower stays at or returns to a firm because the Dodd-
Frank Act prohibits retaliation.74  Protection against 
retaliation did not exist in the past, an absence that almost 
certainly deterred virtually every employee in the twenty years 
prior to the Dodd-Frank Act from stepping forward as a 
whistleblower. 
 
D. Whistleblowers Serving as Cooperating Witnesses 
 
Some of the largest and most prestigious companies are 
implicated in FCPA violations, but only when discovered.75  
There is no evidence to show that without substantial, new 
 
71. See id. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841. 
72. OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, at 1 (2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf. 
73. Id. at 20. 
74. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(h)(1), 124 Stat. at 1841. 
75. See Searcey & Smith, supra note 60. 
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whistleblower activity, violations of the FCPA will subside.  
Further, in their treatment and relations with employees and 
insiders who blow the whistle or cooperate with the 
government, corporations will have to evolve.  In addition to 
rewarding whistleblowers, the Dodd-Frank Act also protects 
them.  This is not to say that a whistleblower will want to 
retain his job given the atmosphere he might experience back 
among fellow employees, but he will have that option, which is 
necessary for the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provision to 
be successful.  That is, the SEC will not pursue the allegations 
of all whistleblowers, in which case they will have to return to 
work, sometimes identified as a whistleblower. 
Accordingly, in authorizing private civil actions, section 
922 of the Dodd-Frank Act creates significant liability for firms 
and its agents who retaliate against a whistleblower: 
 
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any 
other manner discriminate against, a 
whistleblower in the terms and conditions of 
employment because of any lawful act done by 
the whistleblower . . . in initiating, testifying in, 
or assisting in any investigation or judicial or 
administrative action of the Commission based 
upon or related to such information . . . An 
individual who alleges discharge or other 
discrimination. . .may bring an action . . . in the 
appropriate district court of the United States 
for. . . reinstatement with the same seniority 
status that the individual would have had, but 
for the discrimination . . . 2 times the amount of 
back pay otherwise. . .owed to the individual, 
with interest; and compensation for litigation 
costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable 
attorneys’ fees.76 
 
The Act does not indicate that a whistleblower’s remedy is 
limited to section 922. 
 
76. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(h)(1)(A)(ii), (B)(i), (C), 124 Stat. at 1841. 
17
 18 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:1 
Perhaps more significantly, because the whistleblower is 
reporting to a federal agency, the retaliating firm or agent 
could face criminal liability for its retaliation, such as for 
obstruction of justice.77  The applicable obstruction statute 
provides that “[w]hoever corruptly, or by threats . . . influences, 
obstructs, or impedes . . . the due and proper administration of 
the law under which any pending proceeding is being had 
before any department or agency of the United States . . . 
[s]hall be fined . . . [or] imprisoned not more than 5 years.”78  
The statute would protect employees from retaliation as long as 
the government pursued the complaint.  Firms with any 
sophistication would not punish a whistleblower during a 
pending case; they would punish later.  In this event, courts 
would have to stretch minimally to apply the obstruction 
statute in the whistleblower context because most firms 
probably would not try to punish a whistleblower while the 
SEC is engaged in “any investigation or judicial or 
administrative action of the Commission based upon or related 
to such information.”79  They would wait until the action is 
complete. 
In trying to avoid liability for punishing whistleblowers, 
firms could argue that obstruction and tampering statutes do 
not apply because the firms’ retaliation occurred after the 
administrative or judicial action.  The obstruction statute, 
relating to “any pending proceeding,”80 contemplates only 
pending actions.  In response, courts might graft onto § 1505, a 
provision similar to that in 18 U.S.C. § 1512.81  Under § 1512 
(e)(1), an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be 
instituted at the time of the offense.  Still, § 1505, the 
tampering statute, does not contain a similar statutory 
provision providing criminal liability for retaliation after the 
action or proceeding has been completed.  Even if § 1512 
applied only to tampering instituted before and during an 
action, not after, the government could argue that the 
 
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012). 
78. Id. 
79. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(h)(1)(A)(ii), 124 Stat. at 1841. 
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1505. 
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2012) (tampering with a witness, victim, or an 
informant). 
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retaliation against the whistleblower was undertaken to 
discourage future whistleblowers and future SEC actions. 
Regardless, in most instances involving a whistleblower 
under the Dodd-Frank Act, a firm and its agents could be liable 
criminally under 18 U.S.C. § 1513 for retaliating against a 
witness, victim, or an informant following a criminal action or 
investigation.82  Section 1513(e) reads: 
 
Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, 
takes any action harmful to any person, 
including interference with the lawful 
employment or livelihood of any person, for 
providing to a law enforcement officer any 
truthful information relating to the commission 
or possible commission of any Federal offense, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than 10 years, or both.83 
 
Conceivably, a Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower’s information 
might not relate to a criminal offense or, if provided to the 
SEC, be provided to a law enforcement officer, and thus § 
1513(e), if interpreted strictly, would not apply.  In practice, 
however, the SEC will almost surely coordinate with the 
Justice Department in any significant enforcement action. 
Moreover, it is likely that most whistleblower information 
would “relat[e] to the . . . possible commission of any Federal 
offense.”84  In close cases, where there is a question about 
whether the whistleblower reported to a law enforcement agent 
about a possible criminal offense, and where the whistleblower 
returned to work and experienced retaliation, the Justice 
Department might read § 1513(e) broadly and initiate a 
prosecution to promote the whistleblower provision in the 
Dodd-Frank Act.  Regardless of criminal statutes, through its 
rulemaking authority, the SEC has determined that it will 
have enforcement authority over retaliation claims.  “Because 
the anti-retaliation provisions are codified within the Exchange 
 
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2012). 
83. Id. § 1513(e). 
84. Id. 
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Act, [the SEC] agree[s] with commenters that [it has] 
enforcement authority for [sic] . . . employers who retaliate 
against employees for making reports in accordance with 
Section 21F.”85  The whistleblower provision of the Dodd-Frank 
Act86 will probably result in a larger number of cases being 
brought under the FCPA. 
 
E. Extraterritoriality of Bribery Law 
 
But the larger number of FCPA cases is only in relation to 
the paltry number of cases brought by the SEC prior to the 
Dodd-Frank Act.  From 2004 to 2010, the number ranged from 
three to twenty-three.87  Commentators have complained that 
U.S. regulators take a broad view of the elements of the FCPA 
and thus make enforcement of it easier.88  They argue that the 
FCPA’s “domestic concerns” sweep up “[a]ny non-U.S. company 
with a subsidiary incorporated under U.S. law;” that “issuer” 
“means that any non-U.S. companies with stock traded on U.S. 
stock exchanges or with securities subject to filing 
requirements with the SEC” and is thus very inclusive; that 
firms can be liable not only for officers, directors, and 
employees but also for agents; and that, “possibly most 
troubling, the FCPA applies to any person or entity, regardless 
of whether it fits into any of the definitions described above, 
that violates the FCPA within the territory of the United 
States.”89  Indeed, the global criminal jurisdiction of the United 
States continues to expand.  The Dodd-Frank Act provides the 
 
85. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 34-64545, 
at 18 (May 25, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545.pdf 
(section 21F being the SEC rule regarding whistleblowers). 
86. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 
(2010). 
87. Leslie R. Caldwell et al., The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) & 
The Dodd-Frank Act, MORGAN LEWIS (March 8, 2011), http://www.morganlew 
is.com/pubs/FCPAWebinar_Dodd-FrankAct_08march11.pdf. 
88. David W. Simon & Alex Kramer, The US DOJ & SEC – Give’m an 
inch and they take a mile, THEBRIBERYACT.COM (August 11, 2011, 2:32 PM), 
http://thebriberyact.com/2011/08/11/the-us-doj-sec-givem-an-inch-and-they-
take-a-mile. 
89. Id. 
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model.  For example, § 929P(b) defines extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of the “antifraud provisions of the federal securities 
law.”90 
The concept of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of domestic 
law was advanced further when the United Kingdom’s Bribery 
Act took effect on July 21, 2011.91  The FCPA will have a 
counterpart in Europe, thus reducing firms’ opportunity to 
engage in regulatory arbitrage.  Probably stronger than the 
FCPA, the Bribery Act92 “has both a broader scope and 
jurisdictional reach”93 than the FCPA and, according to the UK 
Foreign Office, “will be relevant to any organization that does 
business in the U.K. or with U.K. counterparties.”94  The 
Bribery Act’s crimes include: 
 
1.  Active bribery: promising or giving a financial or  
other advantage.95 
2. Passive bribery: agreeing to receive or accepting 
a financial or other advantage.96 
3.  Bribery of foreign public officials.97 
4. The failure of commercial organisations to 
prevent bribery by an associated person (corporate 
offence).98 
 
The Bribery Act provides for 10 years imprisonment and an 
unlimited fine.99  Regardless of whether the FCPA or the 
Bribery Act has greater extraterritorial jurisdiction, the 
provisions together sweep broadly.  Probably, almost every 
large firm engages in some business in the UK or the U.S. and 
would fall within at least one of the anti-bribery provisions in 
 
90. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b), 124 Stat. at 1864-65. 
91. Klehm III, supra note 35, at 943. 
92. Bribery Act 2010, ch. 23 (Eng.). 
93. Westbrook, supra note 32, at 933. 
94. Klehm III, supra note 35, at 943. 
95. Bribery Act 2010, § 1 (promising or giving a financial or other 
advantage). 
96. Id. § 2 (agreeing to receive or accept a financial or other advantage). 
97. Id. § 6. 
98. Id. §§ 7, 8. 
99. Id. § 11(1)(b). 
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the FCPA or the Bribery Act. 
With the moral force of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”) Anti-Bribery 
Convention100 providing “a broad definition of bribery. . . [and] 
requiring countries to impose dissuasive sanctions and 
committing them to providing mutual legal assistance,” 101 the 
days of deducting bribes from income tax obligations have 
ended.102  The global reach of national statutes is growing 
longer and bribery is becoming more unacceptable.  The 
whistleblower provision in the Dodd-Frank Act extends the 
reach of the FCPA to almost any of a firm’s employees who are 
in positions to discover and report a securities violation.  The 
Dodd-Frank Act has a long arm. 
 
III. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Bribery Act, and 
Conflict Minerals 
 
Through its whistleblower103 and conflict minerals104 
provisions, the Dodd-Frank Act contains a pinch of foreign 
policy105 that is seemingly outside financial regulation, but is 
consistent with the FCPA, although such is not mentioned in 
the Dodd-Frank Act.106  Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
100. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm (last visited 
September 12, 2015). 
101. Stan C. Weeber, Anticorruption Litigation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE 15 (Margaret E. Beare ed., Sage 
Publications, Inc. 2012). 
102. Id. 
103. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 
(2010). 
104. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at § 1504(p) (disclosure of payments 
by resource extraction issuers). 
105. See generally John Burchill, Out of the Heart of Darkness: A New 
Regime for Controlling Resource Extraction in the Congo, 10 ASPER REV. INT'L 
BUS. & TRADE L. 99 (2010) (discussing the history of conflict in the Congo). 
106. As one commentator has noted: 
 
The Congo Conflict Minerals Act (CCMA), introduced on 
April 23, 2009 by Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) (and 
passed as part of the Dodd-Frank bill in July 2010), seeks 
to intervene in the ongoing civil conflict in the eastern part 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/1
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requires “disclosure of payments by resource extraction 
issuers.”107  The outward purpose of § 1504 is to require oil, 
natural gas, and mining companies to reveal to the SEC 
payments made to foreign governments for extraction of the 
particular commodity.108  Its deeper purpose is to prevent 
companies, through investing in oil, gas, and minerals, from 
fostering on-going conflicts in Africa, mainly those originating 
in the Congo, by paying for commodities controlled by the 
combatants, and by bribing them. 
The conflicts in Africa are supported by rival groups 
trading in oil, gas, and minerals.  The Foreign Office of the 
United Kingdom reports that, in the Congo, non-state armed 
groups and rogue brigades within the Congolese national army 
are reportedly involved in the production and trade of conflict 
minerals.109 With serious allegations of mining companies and 
 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by mandating 
disclosure to the SEC of chain-of-custody information 
related to the extraction and processing of columbite-
tantalite (coltan), cassiterite and wolframite. These so-
called ‘conflict minerals’ are mined in the eastern DRC, and 
the proceeds from their eventual sale to electronics 
manufacturers have been traced back to armed bands 
operating in the region. 
 
Daniel M. Firger, Note, Transparency and the Natural Resource Curse: 
Examining the New Extraterritorial Information Forcing Rules in the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1043, 1069 (2010). 
107. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at § 1504(q). 
108. See Robert Percival, Global Law and the Environment, 86 WASH. L. 
REV. 579, 632-33 (2011). 
 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act . . . has been a major 
force in spreading respect for the rule of law in developing 
countries. Enforcement of the FCPA makes it easier for 
companies to resist solicitations for bribes and spreads 
respect for legal norms throughout the supply chain of 
multinational enterprises. The transparency provisions in 
the Dodd-Frank Act are likely to bolster efforts by NGOs 
and private companies to green supply chains and to spread 
respect for legal norms such as the FCPA's prohibition on 
bribery. 
 
Id. 
109. Conflict Minerals, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, (Jun. 19, 
2013), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/conflict-minerals. 
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traders directly dealing with armed groups in eastern DRC, 
“international attention has been brought to bear on how 
armed groups’ involvement in the production and trade of 
minerals and other natural resources has become one of several 
important financing sources sustaining conflict, insecurity and 
human rights violations in parts of eastern DRC [Congo]”.110  
The Dodd-Frank Act’s conflicts minerals provision requires 
specific disclosures, such as a statement in an annual report 
indicating payments made “to a foreign government or the 
Federal Government for the purpose of the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.”111 
Section 1502(a)112 provides the rationale for the conflicts 
minerals provisions: “It is the sense of Congress that the 
exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping to finance conflict 
characterized by extreme levels of violence. . .particularly 
sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to an 
emergency humanitarian situation therein.”113  A “conflict 
mineral” is “columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, gold, 
wolframite, or their derivatives . . . or . . . any other mineral or 
its derivatives determined by the Secretary of State to be 
financing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or 
an adjoining country.”114  The countries adjoining Congo are 
Central African Republic, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Zambia, and Angola.115 
The Dodd-Frank Act and the FCPA are being used by 
Congress to address problems far deeper and more serious than 
bribery116 and books and records violations.117  The laws are the 
 
110. Implications of Conflict Mining, http://computingissuescomp1220uwi. 
weebly.com/implications-caused-by-conflict-minerals.html (last visited Oct. 4, 
2015). 
111. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at § 1504(q)(2)(a). 
112. Id. § 1502(a). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. § 1502(e)(4)(A)-(B). 
115. Advisory, New Corporate Social Responsibility Requirements: Dodd-
Frank Act Mandates Disclosure to SEC of Payments to Foreign Governments 
and Use of Minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Arnold & 
Porter L.L.P., (Aug. 2010), http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/ 
Advisory-New_Corporate_Social_Responsibility_Requirements_081310.pdf. 
116. FCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 103(a), 91 Stat. 1494 (1977). 
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levers to lift the lid off corporate payments for conflict minerals 
to warring factions who use the payments to purchase 
weapons.  It is true that under the Dodd-Frank Act issuers 
have to keep records beyond those required by the FCPA, 
although the requirement does not seem overly burdensome.  
In an annual report, companies must include: 
 
[I]nformation relating to any payment made by 
the resource extraction issuer, a subsidiary of the 
resource extraction issuer, or an entity under the 
control of the resource extraction issuer to a 
foreign government or the development of oil, 
natural gas, or minerals, including. . .the type 
and total amount of such payments made for 
each project.118 
 
Central Africa is a relatively undeveloped region, where Congo 
has great quantities of natural resources, “including large 
deposits of gold, copper, zinc, tantalum (extracted from coltan), 
tin, cobalt, and diamonds,” and a staggering estimate of $24 
trillion in total mineral wealth.119  “Notwithstanding the 
country’s vast natural resources and mineral wealth, the DRC 
is one of the poorest countries in the world, with [a] per capita  
. . . income of . . . $171 in 2009.”120  In such a relatively 
unregulated, rich environment, bribery and corruption can be 
endemic. 
A sober question is whether the FCPA’s prohibitions on 
 
117. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, § 13, 
invalidated by Nat’l Ass’n Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
118. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at § 1504(q)(2)(A). 
119. John Burchill, supra note 105, at 99-100 (2010). Also adding that: 
 
Currently 74% of all cobalt mined in continental Africa (49% 
of all production worldwide) comes from the DRC; 69% of 
tin; roughly 50% of all tantalum; 17% of all copper; 11% of 
zinc; and 2% of all gold also comes from the DRC. Exports in 
these minerals from the DRC were estimated to be $ 6.59 
billion in 2008, up significantly from 2006. 
 
Id. 
120. Id. at 108-09 (citations omitted). 
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bribery, as well as the requirements of the FCPA and Dodd-
Frank to keep books and records and to disclose payments 
regarding conflict minerals, can make significant headway into 
the violence in Africa.  Militias fight over such conflict minerals 
as copper, gold, zinc, tantalum, tin, cobalt, and diamonds, and 
they work to control “mines and taxation points inside Congo – 
estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars in 2008 
alone.”121  The challenges in the Congo stem from a century of 
unremitting violence. 
 
From 1885 until 1908 King Leopold II of Belgium 
ran the ‘Congo Free State’ as his own private 
business interest, turning the local inhabitants 
into slaves to harvest rubber and ivory for his 
personal benefit. Pursuant to vast and exclusive 
concessions issued to business interests 
controlled solely or jointly by the King. . .the 
inhabitants were subject to sadistic beatings, 
dismemberment, and torture in order to extract 
these resources with little or no compensation.  It 
has been estimated that as many as ten million 
died under Leopold’s rule and that the 
population of the Congo was reduced from ‘20-30 
million. . . at the beginning of the colonial era to 
8.5 million [by] 1911’ (citations omitted).122 
 
Today, life is not much better.  It is estimated that five million 
people have died from conflict and forty-five thousand more die 
each month in the Congo.123  The Dodd-Frank Act and the 
FCPA may have some, albeit small, salutary effect on limiting 
the violence that is, in part, impelled by payments from outside 
the country. 
 
IV.  Conclusion: Finding and Proving Bribery 
 
National regulatory regimes in the United States and 
 
121. Id. at 108. 
122. Id. at 104-05. 
123. Id. at 108. 
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United Kingdom have begun to exert additional, significant 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, with an enhanced and sharper 
focus on specific financial functions of corporations, firms, and 
individuals.  While not specifically broadening the FCPA, the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower-reward and conflict-minerals-
reporting-requirement provisions will increase the likelihood of 
bribery prosecutions and books-and-records enforcements 
actions under the criminal and civil provisions of the FCPA.124  
The SEC has not yet implemented the conflicts minerals 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act125 – and, like the accounting 
and records provision in the FCPA,126 the conflict minerals 
provision provides no criminal sanction for companies that use 
the minerals .127 
But the conflict minerals provision’s disclosure-of-
payments requirement permits greater public scrutiny, 
allowing “nam[ing] and sham[ing]” of companies that use 
conflict minerals.128  Significantly, the conflict-minerals 
disclosure mandates a trail of documents whose creation 
depends on corporate conversations and investigations.129  
These can provide compelling evidence of bribery in FCPA 
prosecutions.  The Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provision 
greatly increases the likelihood that some person in what is 
now a much longer train of documents and conversations will 
come forward and provide information.  More people will create 
more information and additional people will have access to it.  
In sum, a disclosure requirement and rewards for 
whistleblowers make bribery convictions more likely through 
the addition of evidence and through the liability and 
subsequent cooperation that may occur when witnesses and 
insiders lie about130 or cover up131 matters related to an 
 
124. See FCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 103(a), 91 Stat. 1494 (1977). 
125. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at §§ 1502(p), 1504(p). 
126. See FCPA, supra note 29. 
127. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at §1504(p). 
128. Marcia Narine, Dodd-Frank and Conflict Minerals- Can a 
Governance Disclosure Eliminate Rape, Corruption and Child Slavery in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo- Part 1, CONGLOMERATE, (Dec. 6, 2011), 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/12/dodd-frank-and-conflict-minerals-
can-a-governance-disclosure-eliminate-rape-corruption-and-child-sla.html. 
129. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at §§ 1502(p), 1504(p). 
130. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1621 (2012) (regarding false statements and 
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investigation. 
Where the FCPA’s accounting and records provision 
requires more general information for investors, such as 
“books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, 
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions 
of the assets of the issuer,”132 the conflict-minerals provision is 
aimed at more specific disclosures.  An issuer must disclose 
payments “to a foreign government or the Federal Government 
for the purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural 
gas, or minerals, including . . . the type and total amount of 
such payments.”133  Perhaps the greatest utility of the Dodd-
Frank Act’s whistleblower134 and conflict-minerals135 provisions 
is that they buttress the criminal bribery provisions in the 
FCPA136 and the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act.137  The bribery 
provisions in the FCPA138 and the Bribery Act139 are similar in 
that they prohibit improper quid pro quo agreements.  
However, the Bribery Act’s provisions are considerably broader 
and more detailed than the prohibited agreements in the 
FCPA, which generally prohibits bribing foreign officials, but 
does not prohibit “bribing” foreign private citizens.140 
 
perjury, respectfully). 
131. See 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (2012) (regarding obstruction of criminal 
investigations). 
132. FCPA, supra note 29. 
133. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at §1504(q)(2)(A). 
134. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1841. 
135. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at §§ 1502(p), 1504(p). 
136. Which states: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any issuer . . . to make use of the 
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, 
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any 
money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of 
the giving of anything of value to . . . any foreign official 
for purposes of . . . influencing any act or decision of such 
foreign official. 
 
FCPA § 103(a), 91 Stat. 1494. 
137. See Bribery Act 2010, ch. 23, § 2(1)-(8) (Eng.). 
138. See FCPA §103(a), 91 Stat. 1494. 
139. Bribery Act 2010, §§ 2(2), 4(1). 
140. See FCPA §103(a), 91 Stat. 1494. 
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The Bribery Act prohibits improper quid pro quo 
agreements141 relating to “foreign public officials”142 and, 
broadly, bribery where the “function or activity relates” to “(a) 
any function of a public nature, (b) any activity connected with 
a business, (c) any activity performed in the course of a 
person’s employment, [and] (d) any activity performed by or on 
behalf of a body of persons (whether corporate or 
unincorporate).”143  Under the Bribery Act, it is questionable 
whether even the payment of “grease” – permitted under the 
FCPA as a payment to a government official to expedite a 
routine government action144 – would be permissible.  But from 
the United Kingdom’s perspective on the Dodd-Frank Act, 
“[g]iven the current lack of Government capacity to 
enforce/monitor systems in countries like the DRC [Congo], it is 
likely that effective maintenance and oversight of these 
schemes will, in practice, become the responsibility of 
companies that have an interest in maintaining them.”145  
Thus, a broad bribery statute is more justified given the 
difficulty of regulating corporations in foreign nations. 
The United Kingdom’s rationale for the Bribery Act, a lack 
of resources and the difficulty of monitoring corporate behavior 
in foreign nations, is perhaps the primary justification for the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s reward system for whistleblowers and 
conflict-minerals disclosure requirement for firms.  Firms will 
have greater costs because they will have to improve their 
compliance culture and defend against even erroneous 
whistleblower complaints.  It will also be more costly to 
investigate and disclose information about payments regarding 
conflict minerals.  But, without compulsion, the FCPA 
prosecutions and enforcement actions have been few.  In the 
 
141. Bribery Act 2010, § 6(1)-(8). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. § 3(1)-(7). 
144. FCPA § 103(a), 91 Stat. 1494 (“[T]his section shall not apply to any 
facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or 
party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance 
of a routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or party 
official.”). 
145. Adrian Ladbury, Supply chain risk in spotlight as new SEC rules 
target central Africa-analysis, COMMERCIAL RISK EUR. (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.commercialriskeurope.com/cre/1077/63/Supply-chain-risk-in-
spotlight-as-new-SEC-rules-target-central-Africa-analysis/. 
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end, the heavy government thumbs in the United States and 
United Kingdom are represented by the bribery provisions in 
the Bribery Act and FCPA.  Corporations and their employees 
want to keep a safe distance from these statutes.  The safest 
response is for firms to work harder to eliminate bribery. 
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